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ABSTRACT This essay examines the implications of openness to trade,
capital mobility, and exchange rate flexibility for the fiscal multiplier. It
presents a New Open Economy Macroeconomics model which is extended
with the formation of ‘deep habits’ by individual households. Hereby, an
inter-temporal substitution effect is constituted, which causes monopolisti-
cally competitive producers to move their markups counter-cyclically and
generates a positive fiscal multiplier of private consumption. The main
outcome is a mechanism elaborating that both openness to trade and ex-
change rate flexibility limit the fiscal multiplier in equilibrium, and that
capital mobility increases the fiscal multiplier in the short run. This dy-
namic model differs in its implications from a static model, such as the
Mundell-Fleming model, and it is consistent with recent empirical findings.
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1 Introduction
Central contributions to macroeconomic research have been dedicated to the effect of
fiscal stimulus on the business cycle, which is a topic of vital relevance not only in the
face of the recent global crisis. Ramey (2011) provides a survey of empirical literature,
summarizing that fiscal multipliers have been estimated to lie essentially between 0.8
and 1.5, depending on the setting and the method of estimation.1 While the responses
of output and consumption to an increase in government spending have weakened over
the past three decades, as it is reported by Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, and Diba (2009),
globalization at the same time has made economies increasingly interdependent. Two
groups of authors stand out with their contributions to estimating empirically the
effect of economic openness on the fiscal multiplier. Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh
(2010) apply a structural VAR approach, providing evidence of both openness to trade
and exchange rate flexibility being negatively related with fiscal effectiveness. Dellas,
Neusser, and Wälti (2005) identify a positive effect of capital mobility on the fiscal
multiplier. Both of these studies are based on a panel of OECD countries. Ilzetzki et
al. (2010) consider developing countries in addition.
These empirical findings to some extent stand in contrast to static theory, in par-
ticular to the application of the IS-LM model to a two-country setting by Mundell and
Fleming (1962), which implies that economic openness deteriorates the transmission
mechanism of fiscal policy. While the well-known implications of the closed-economy
version of the IS-LM model are that a fiscal expansion increases output, employment
and consumption – with an output multiplier larger than one – while crowding out
private investment, the open-economy version suggests that openness to trade, capital
mobility, and exchange rate flexibility limit (or even entirely offset) the stimulating
effect of fiscal policy: If borders are open for trade, an increase in income produced
by a fiscal expansion drives up imports and therefore reduces the trade balance. This
leads to an international spill-over effect. In a regime of flexible exchange rates, fiscal
expansion raises the real interest rate and causes the currency to nominally appreciate.
Under sluggish prices, this leads to an increase in the real exchange rate, and hence to
a deterioration of the trade balance. In a small economy where capital is fully mobile,
capital movement completely offsets the effect of the fiscal expansion on output. So
far the implications of the static IS-LM theory.
More recently, Dellas et al. (2005) and Canzoneri et al. (2009) have introduced
dynamic models describing the relationship of openness and fiscal effectiveness. In
contrast to the IS-LM theory, Dellas et al. (2005) suggest that a flexible exchange
rate regime does not limit the effectiveness of fiscal policy. In their model, the output
multiplier can even be larger under flexible exchange rates than under a peg, as long
as monetary policy does not follow a standard Taylor rule and counter the fiscal
expansion.
The present essay aims to match the empirical evidence with a dynamic, stochastic
model which explains for the effect of all the three main dimensions of economic open-
ness in this respect (openness to trade, capital mobility, and exchange rate flexibility).
1To name a more extreme case, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) have applied regime switching
structural VARs to this topic. They derive a point estimate of a fiscal multiplier going up to 2.48 if
an economy is caught in a recession.
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The main predictions of the model are to be listed here:
• Openness to trade decreases the fiscal multiplier, which is in line with the em-
pirical findings by Ilzetzki et al. (2010), and with the IS-LM model.
• Capital mobility increases the fiscal multiplier. This is consistent with the evi-
dence provided by Dellas et al. (2005), but stands in contrast to the Mundell-
Fleming version of the IS-LM model.
• Exchange rate flexibility increases the fiscal multiplier during the short term of
a business cycle. In the long run, there is a negative equilibrium effect. This is
compatible with Dellas et al. (2005), as well as with Ilzetzki et al. (2010) who
estimate a negative long-run effect.
The supply side of the model is based on a continuum of producers which operate
under monopolistic competition and therefore attain a positive markup of price over
cost. Price rigidity is introduced by means of convex price adjustment costs. Further,
monetary policy is implemented via a standard Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rule which
targets inflation and the output gap, and, for the purpose of the research question,
also the exchange rate. In order to model capital mobility, convex portfolio holding
costs are added to the budget constraint of the households. Government consumption
gives no utility to the households and is financed via a lump-sum tax.
A further important ingredient of the model is the formation of ‘deep habits’ by
consumers at the level of individual goods, a property which is borrowed from the
seminal paper by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2005). The main implication is
that households tend to consume more of a good today if they have already consumed
it in the past. To motivate this empirically, one may think for example of brand loy-
alty which results from a process of personal identification of consumers with certain
products. Another example are switching costs which may occur if a certain level of
know-how is necessary in order to use a given product (think of computer platforms).
A further reason for habit-driven behavior is personal taste, which may even inten-
sify in goods which are consumed more frequently. Empirical evidence of habitual
consumption behavior is provided by Chintagunta, Kyriazidou, and Perktold (2001).
In the model, this kind of behavior of households provides firms with an incentive to
move their markup in counter-cyclical fashion, creating a positive fiscal multiplier on
private consumption, and hereby boosting up the multiplier on output. This stands in
contrast to more classic New Keynesian (NK) models, in which a negative wealth effect
of government spending typically crowds out consumption. The studies provided by
Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2008) and Cantore, Levine, Melina, and Pearlman
(2012) employ the mechanism of deep habits. However, they do not analyze economic
openness as a determinant of the fiscal multiplier. Ravn et al. (2008) present a two-
country model with perfectly flexible prices and no internationally mobile bonds, while
Cantore et al. (2012) model a closed economy. In the present essay, counter-cyclical
firm markups are a key element for explaining the effect of openness to trade with
regard to the fiscal multiplier.
The literature provides alternative ways of modeling a crowding-in effect of gov-
ernment spending on private consumption. Hall (2009) suggests that consumption
and work effort are complementary in the utility function of households, and directly
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imposes a firm markup which is constructed to move counter-cyclically. Alternatively,
rule-of-thumb consumers are discussed by Gali, Valles, and Lopez-Salido (2004, 2007).
With this approach, it is assumed that consumers are not forward-looking and there-
fore fully spend their budget on consumption in every period, an assumption which
is criticized by Colciago (2006) and Natvik (2010). Another approach, which however
has gathered less attention, is provided by Kühn, Muysken, and Veen (2008) who
assume that government spending directly enhances productivity of the firms in an
economy. Finally, Canzoneri et al. (2009) present a different approach, assuming that
households are not fully informed about the type of shock that hits an economy. That
is, households cannot identify with certainty whether a shock has had an impact on
government spending, technology, inflation or foreign preference for domestic goods.
Since the latter three increase the permanent income of households, consumers react
to any shock (the type of which being unknown to them) by increasing consumption.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the derivation
of the model. Section 3 shows the calibration, and section 4 presents the main re-
sults. Section 5 discusses the role of economic openness in the mechanism of a fiscal
multiplier. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
This section presents the main dynamic small open economy model. There is a con-
tinuum of monopolistically competitive producers incurring price adjustment costs.
Monetary policy follows an interest rate rule which targets inflation, the output gap,
and the exchange rate. Convex portfolio holding costs are part of the representative
household’s budget constraint in order to model capital mobility. Government con-
sumption is financed via a lump-sum tax and provides no utility to the household.
The domestic and foreign consumers, as well as the government, form deep habits of
consumption at the level of individual goods, which creates an incentive for the mo-
nopolistically competitive producers to move their markup in a counter-cyclical way.
As a result, the negative wealth effect induced by a fiscal expansion is compensated,
which otherwise leads households to decrease consumption and increase work effort.
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, it is assumed that foreign produc-
ers export their goods at an exogenous price, and that also consumption of domestic
goods by foreign consumers follows an exogenous process. The foreign economy is not
modeled in further detail.
2.1 Domestic Households
2.1.1 Decision at time t
The representative domestic household consumes a composite good of domestically
produced individual goods, cdt , and a composite good of foreign individual goods, c
f
t .
2
2Throughout the text, the following conventions in terms of notation will be met: The subscript
t denotes the time period, the superscripts d and f denote that a variable belongs to the domestic
or the foreign economy, respectively. The expression ‘obj’ is not an actual superscript but rather a
part of the name of a variable such as cobj. All variables are scalars, they are denoted in italics, and
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These two composite goods are combined to cobjt , the final index which is an argument
of the utility function of the household:
cobjt =
[
ω(cdt )
1−1/ξ + (1− ω)(cft )1−1/ξ
]1/(1−1/ξ)
(1)
This specification is borrowed from Ravn et al. (2008). It is an aggregator function
with constant elasticity of substitution, as it is discussed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Here, ξ ∈ (1,∞) denotes the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods, and ω ∈ (0, 1) stands for the openness preference of the household. That is,
ω by construction is unrelated to the actual substitutability of domestic and foreign
goods with respect to observable features other than the country of origin. (Think of
people wanting to buy a domestically produced good rather than a foreign one just
because it comes from their own country, even if the goods themselves are identical.
Then, such households are said to have a home bias, so ω > 0.5.) Hence, in the
case where domestic and foreign goods are prefect substitutes (ξ →∞ and therefore
cobjt → ωcdt + (1 − ω)c
f
t ), it is only the home bias, ω, and the prices which decide
how the households split up their budget across domestic and foreign goods.3 On
the other hand if ξ → 1, meaning that domestic and foreign goods differ significantly
(or are even complements), decreasing marginal utility attained both from consuming
domestic goods and from consuming foreign goods implies that consumers care not
only about their home bias, but that they also want to consume a mix of domestic
and foreign goods, even if their home bias is strong.
The household chooses cdt , c
f
t , ht, B
d
t , B
f
t in order to maximize the present value
of its present and future utility Ut(c
obj
t , ht) ∀ t ∈ [0,∞) subject to a budget constraint
max. Et
{
∞∑
j=0
βj
[
(cobjt+j)
1−σ
1− σ
− ψ
h1+φt+j
1 + φ
]}
s.t. P dt c
d
t +$
d
c,t + etP
f
t c
f
t +$
f
c,t + Pt(B
d
t + etB
f
t ) =
Wtht − Tt + Pt−1(Rt−1Bdt−1 + etR?t−1B
f
t−1)−
χ
2
Pt(etB
f
t )
2 + Ft :
where ht denotes hours of labor, B
d
t denotes domestic bond holdings, B
f
t foreign bond
holdings, P dt the price of the domestic composite good, P
f
t the price of the foreign
composite good, Pt the domestic consumer price index, et the nominal exchange rate
(in price notation), Wt the nominal wage rate, Tt a lump-sum tax, Rt the domestic
interest rate, R? the foreign interest rate, and Ft the profits of domestic firms.4 All
prices are denoted in domestic currency. As the budget constraint shows, it is costly
for the household to hold foreign bonds, a circumstance which is modeled by a term
that is convex-increasing in foreign bonds and weighted by χ > 0. Note that these
have a time period subscript. Constants/parameters are likewise denoted in italics but do not have
a time subscript.
3In this extreme case where ξ → ∞: If ω/(1 − ω) > P dt e−1t (P
f
t )
−1, the household buys domestic
goods only.
4The superscript ? denotes throughout the paper that a variable or parameter belongs to the
foreign economy. Et stands for the expected present value at time period t of a function of future
values.
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portfolio costs are a dead-weight loss to the economy; they are not redistributed, a
feature which will show up in the general equilibrium condition of the model. The
parameter χ serves as a measure of capital mobility (with a lower value of χ meaning
that capital is more mobile). The parameter β must lie strictly in between zero and
one. This setup of budget constraint and portfolio holding cost is in the spirit of
Dellas et al. (2005) and Collard, Dellas, and Diba (2011). The terms $dc,t and $
f
c,t
emerge from the habit formation of past periods, as will be described in the following
paragraph. It holds that P dt c
d
t + $
d
c,t = P
d
t x
d
c,t and etP
f
t c
f
t + $
f
c,t = etP
f
c,tx
f
c,t. The
first-order conditions of the representative household can be expressed as
(cobjt )
1/ξ−σω(cdt )
−1/ξ = λtp
d
t (2)
(cobjt )
1/ξ−σ(1− ω)(cft )−1/ξ = λtrertp
f
t (3)
ψhφt = λtwt (4)
λt = βRt Et
(
λt+1
πt+1
)
(5)
λt = β
R?t
1 + χbft
Et
(
et+1λt+1
etπt+1
)
(6)
where rert represents the real exchange rate.
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2.1.2 Habit Formation
The two composite goods cdt and c
f
t , which go into the final index that delivers utility to
the household, are habit-adjusted. Following the example of Ravn et al. (2005, 2008),
‘deep habits’ are formed at the level of each individual variety i of domestic and
foreign goods. Habit formation is external to the individual household, meaning that
households are trying to ‘catch up with the Joneses’. Technically, this is implemented
simply by assuming that the habit stock of the domestic good of variety i, denoted
by sdc,t(i), creates a gap between c
d
t (i) and x
d
t (i). The latter denotes the actual (not
habit-adjusted) amount of output of variety i consumed by the household. Sticking
to the case of domestic goods for the explanation of the mechanism, each variety i
belongs to the set {d} of domestically produced goods. Let
cdt =
{∫ 1
0
[
xdc,t(i)− θsdc,t(i)
]1−1/η
di
}1/(1−1/η)
(7)
where θ ∈ [0, 1) measures the intensity of habit formation, and η > 1 denotes the
elasticity of substitution across varieties. The mirror image is given with respect to
foreign goods. From a technical point of view, the marginal utility derived by the
households from one unit of variety i is increasing in the habit stock built on variety i
in the past. From an economic point of view, this gives the household an incentive to
consume more of variety i today, if it has consumed i yesterday. This yields a crucial
incentive for the firms which are setting their markups, as will be discussed below.
The habit stock evolves according to
sdc,t(i) = ρs
d
c,t−1(i) + (1− ρ)x̄dc,t(i)
5The following definitions are made: λt = ΛtPt, where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier, Wt = wtPt,
pft = P
f
t (P
?
t )
−1, rert = etP
?
t P
−1
t , b
f
t = etB
f
t , and πt+1 = Pt+1P
−1
t .
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where x̄dc,t(i) is the average amount of output of variety i consumed per household.
Hence, for a given level of cdt , the household chooses x
d
c,t(i) to minimize its total ex-
penditure on domestic goods,
∫ 1
0
P dt (i)x
d
c,t(i)di, subject to equation (7). This yields
the demand functions of the domestic household:
xdc,t(i) =
(
P dt (i)
Pt
)−η
cdt + θs
d
c,t−1(i)
xfc,t(i) =
(
etP
f
t (i)
Pt
)−η
cft + θs
f
c,t−1(i)
The last equation shows the demand of the domestic household for the foreign good
of variety i, which is derived analogously to the domestic counterpart. Habits are
formed for foreign goods in the same manner as for domestic goods. The expenditure
of the household in period t to cover its habits carried over from t−1 are given by
$dc,t = θ
∫ 1
0
P dt (i)s
d
c,t−1 and $
f
c,t = θ
∫ 1
0
etP
f
t (i)s
f
c,t−1. The household takes this amount
as given for its decision at time t.
2.2 Domestic Government
The domestic government forms deep habits of consumption at the level of each variety
i, analogously to the household. Hence:
gdt =
{∫ 1
0
[
xdg,t(i)− θsdg,t(i)
]1−1/η
di
}1/(1−1/η)
In contrast to the household however, the government consumes domestically produced
goods only. gdt denotes the habit-adjusted composite good, while x
d
g,t(i) represents the
actual amount of variety i that is consumed. The habit stock evolves according to
sdg,t(i) = ρs
d
g,t−1(i) + (1− ρ)xdg,t(i)
The government does not buy any bonds and faces the static budget constraint
Ptgt =
∫ 1
0
P dt (i)x
d
g,t(i)di
where gt equals total real government expenditure and follows an exogenous process
gt+1 = γ
ggt + (1− γg)ḡ + εgt+1 (8)
Cost minimization yields a demand function which is analogous to the one of the
representative household again:
xdg,t(i) =
(
P dt (i)
Pt
)−η
gdt + θs
d
g,t−1(i)
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2.3 Domestic Firms
Each firm i is a monopolistic producer of a good of variety i, using linear technology
with labor (hours worked) as the only input, so its individual output at time t equals
ht(i). It faces the total individual demand yt(i) = x
d
c,t(i) + x
d
g,t(i) + x
d?
c,t(i), which is
provided by domestic and foreign households, and the domestic government. Note at
this point that due to portfolio holding costs of the household, and price adjustment
costs of the firm, in a symmetric equilibrium the aggregate market clearing condition
of the domestic economy must satisfy
ht = x
d
c,t + x
d
g,t + x
d?
c,t +
χ
2
(bft )
2 +
ϕp
2
(πd − 1)2ht (9)
Firm i sets its price P dt (i) which is denoted in domestic currency. It incurs a cost
whenever it changes the price from one period to the next. This cost is given (in
nominal terms) by
ϕp
2
(
P dt (i)
P dt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Ptht
where ht denotes total aggregate supply in the symmetric equilibrium. Note that this
price adjustment cost is not a tax, but a dead-weight loss to the economy.6 (Think
of menu costs, contracts that are costly to be changed, etc.) Price rigidity is an
important feature of this model. It makes monetary policy more effective. Exchange
rate targeting is crucial for explaining the effect of openness on the fiscal multiplier.
Also, price rigidity causes the firms to change their markup through a ‘wage channel’
rather than a ‘price channel.’ Firm i maximizes the profit function
E0
∞∑
t=0
Φ0,t
{
[P dt (i)−Wt] · [xdc,t(i) + xdg,t(i) + xd?c,t(i)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=yt(i)
−ϕp
2
(
P dt (i)
P dt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Ptht
}
As the firm makes its price-setting decision, it takes into account the demand functions
and the laws of habit stock evolution of the domestic and foreign households and the
government. This is crucial for the model’s predictions concerning the effects of a fiscal
expansion, as it yields that firms react to changes in aggregate demand by moving their
markup in counter-cyclical fashion.
The mechanism of counter-cyclical markups, which is analogous to Ravn et al.
(2008), is to be explained here. Each firm i faces an individual demand function of
the form
xdt (i) = [P
d
t (i)]
−ηht(i) + θs
d
t−1(i)
This individual demand is the sum of a price-elastic component, [P dt (i)]
−ηht(i), and a
price inelastic component, θsdt−1(i). The elastic component is proportional to aggregate
demand of the current period, ht, while the inelastic component stems from the habit
formation of past periods. Therefore, the price elasticity of the individual demand
function that firm i faces is a weighted average of η and 0. As a result of an increase in
6Price adjustment costs of this type are used for example by Dellas et al. (2005).
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current aggregate demand at time t (caused by a fiscal expansion), the weight of the
elastic component increases, making the individual demand function more price-elastic.
In other words, the price elasticity of individual demand is pro-cyclical. This provides
a clear intra-temporal incentive for the firm to charge a counter-cyclical markup.
In addition, there is an inter-temporal incentive: As firms anticipate that the habit
stock is a weighted average of past sales, they face a dynamic profit maximization
problem. By decreasing the markup today, a firm can acquire ‘new customers’ which
will return tomorrow as they will be ‘bound to their own habits’. As the results will
show, this inter-temporal incentive is even more intense regarding that in the phase
of transition after a fiscal shock, firms are even able to slightly increase their markup
above the steady state level for a few periods, and hereby partly compensate for the
initial drop in the markup.
Firm i chooses the optimal levels of P dt (i), x
d
c,t(i), x
d
g,t(i), x
d?
c,t(i), s
d
c,t(i), s
d
g,t(i), and
sd?c,t(i), taking as given Φ0,t, Wt, P
d
t , P
d?
t , c
d
t , g
d
t , c
d?
t , and the initial conditions s
d
c,t−1(i),
sdg,t−1(i), and s
d?
c,t−1(i). The first-order conditions of the symmetric equilibrium are
given by
0 = pdt yt − ϕp
(
πdt − 1
)
πdt ht − η
[
νc,t(x
d
c,t − θsdc,t−1)
+νg,t(x
d
g,t − θsdg,t−1) + ν?c,t(xd?c,t − θsd?c,t−1)
]
+ βϕp
λt+1
λt
πdt+1
(
πdt+1 − 1
)
ht+1 (10)
wt = p
d
t − νc,t − (1− ρ)%c,t (11)
wt = p
d
t − νg,t − (1− ρ)%g,t (12)
wt = p
d
t − ν?c,t − (1− ρ)%?c,t (13)
%c,t = β
λt+1
λt
(ρ%c,t+1 − θνc,t+1) (14)
%g,t = β
λt+1
λt
(ρ%g,t+1 − θνg,t+1) (15)
%?c,t = β
λt+1
λt
(
ρ%?c,t+1 − θν?c,t+1
)
(16)
where πdt = P
d
t (P
d
t−1)
−1, λt+1λ
−1
t = Λt+1Pt+1Λ
−1
t P
−1
t , and Wt = wtPt. Again, Λt is
the Lagrange multiplier of the representative household’s optimization problem. It is
related to the firm’s discount factor by assuming that Φ0,t = β
jΛtΛ
−1
0 . Further, νc,t,
νg,t, ν
?
c,t, %c,t, %g,t, and %
?
c,t are the Lagrange multipliers of firm i’s optimization prob-
lem. Note that, since initial habit stocks are assumed to be identical across different
varieties, all domestic firms will charge the same price in a symmetric equilibrium.
Therefore, P dt (i) = P
d
t for all i. It follows that in equilibrium, all prices and consump-
tion quantities will be the same across varieties i. In other words, in the symmetric
equilibrium, i drops. For matters of illustration, let the real markup per unit of output
that the producer gets in the symmetric equilibrium be denoted as µt = p
d
t − wt.
2.4 Rest of the World
For simplicity, since the model sketches a small open economy, the bond holdings of
foreign households are not modeled explicitly. Also, only the consumption of domestic
9
goods by foreign households is part of the model (but not their consumption of foreign
goods), and foreign households pay no taxes as their government is not modeled. The
consumption of domestic goods by foreign households follows the exogenous process
cd?t+1 = γ
d?cd?t + (1− γd?)c̄d? + εd?t+1 (17)
where cd?t is the habit-adjusted composite good
cd?t =
{∫ 1
0
[
xd?c,t(i)− θsd?c,t(i)
]1−1/η
di
}1/(1−1/η)
Foreign households form habits over consumption of domestic goods at the level of
each variety i, in the same manner as the domestic households do. The habit stock
evolves according to
sd?c,t(i) = ρs
d?
c,t−1(i) + (1− ρ)xd?c,t(i)
The foreign household demands the amount xd?c,t(i) of variety i, minimizing its expen-
diture
∫ 1
0
xd?c,t(i)P
d?
t (i)et
−1di. This yields the demand function for variety i:
xd?c,t(i) =
(
P dt (i)
etP ?t
)−η
cd?t + θs
d?
c,t−1(i)
The foreign firm (i) sells its goods at a price per unit of P ft , denoted in foreign currency,
which is exogenously given by
pft+1 = γ
fpft + (1− γf )p̄f + ε
f
t+1 (18)
2.5 Symmetric General Equilibrium
As mentioned above, due to symmetry and the assumption of an identical initial stock
of habits across varieties, prices and output quantities are identical across all varieties
i. Therefore, the i-suffix is neglected for the characterization of the symmetric general
equilibrium.
2.5.1 Price Level
Private consumption is simply defined as ct = x
d
c,t+x
f
c,t, while government consumption
is equal to gt = x
d
g,t. The consumer price index (CPI) is defined as an expenditure
weighted average of the prices of the composite goods, which is similar to the model
of Ravn et al. (2008):
Pt = γP
d
t + (1− γ)etP
f
t where γ =
P̄ d(x̄dc + x̄
d
g)
P̄ d(x̄dc + x̄
d
g) + etP̄
f x̄fc
By defining pdt = P
d
t P
−1
t and p
f
t = P
f
t (P
?
t )
−1, where P ?t is the foreign CPI which is
exogenous to the domestic small open economy, the definition of the domestic real
exchange rate (rert = etP
?
t P
−1
t ) can be used to find: rert p
f
t = etP
f
t P
−1
t . Hence,
dividing the domestic CPI formula by Pt itself yields
1 = γ pdt + (1− γ) rert p
f
t (19)
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2.5.2 Aggregate Output and Market Clearing
The trade balance is given by
TBt = x
d?
c,t − x
f
c,t (20)
Adding up domestic aggregate consumption, government spending, and the trade bal-
ance yields aggregate output, yt = ct + gt + TBt, which is equal to
yt = x
d
c,t + x
f
c,t + x
d
g,t + x
d?
t − x
f
c,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=TBt
= xdc,t + x
d
g,t + x
d?
t (21)
As mentioned above, due to portfolio holding costs of the household, and price adjust-
ment costs of the firm, in the symmetric equilibrium the aggregate market clearing
condition is
ht = x
d
c,t + x
d
g,t + x
d?
c,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=yt
+
χ
2
(bft )
2 +
ϕp
2
(πd − 1)2ht (22)
This specification takes into account the assumption that portfolio costs of the house-
holds, and price adjustment costs of the firms, are a dead-weight loss to the economy.
2.5.3 Asset Market
The net return which the domestic economy attains from foreign bond holdings must
equal the trade balance (TBt), minus the dead-weight loss from portfolio holding and
price adjustment (DWLt). It must hold that
bft =
et
et−1πt
R?t−1b
f
t−1−ht + yt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−DWLt
+xd?c,t − x
f
c,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=TBt
(23)
where bft = etB
f
t .
2.5.4 Domestic Inflation
The inflation rate of the domestic CPI, πt = PtP
−1
t−1, is related to the price of the
domestic good as follows:
πdt =
P d
P dt−1
=
pdtPt
pdt−1Pt−1
=
pdt
pdt−1
πt ⇒ pdt =
πdt
πt
pdt−1 (24)
The inflation rate of the foreign CPI, π? = P ?t (P
?
t−1)
−1, must only satisfy π?t =
pft (p
f
t−1)
−1. This is due to the fact that the foreign economy is large and therefore
the foreign prices are not influenced by the domestic economy. However, the foreign
CPI influences the domestic CPI. The two are linked by
rert =
pft
pft−1
· 1
πt
rert−1 (25)
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2.5.5 Foreign Interest Rate
The utility function of the foreign consumer is U?t = (c
d?
t )
1−σ/(1− σ). Therefore, the
foreign interest rate must satisfy
(cd?t )
−σ = βR?t Et
[
(cd?t+1)
−σpft
pft+1
]
(26)
2.5.6 Monetary Policy
The domestic central bank sets its interest rate following a Henderson-McKibbin-
Taylor type of a rule:7
log(Rt) = ρr log(Rt−1) + (1− ρr)
{
log(R̄) + γπ[log(πt)− log(π̄)]
+γy[log(yt)− log(ȳ)] + γe[log(et)− log(ē)]} (27)
3 Calibration
I have used parameter values which are common in the open economy literature. The
benchmark calibration is reported in table 1. Openness preference is set to 0.85, the
value used by Dellas et al. (2005), which represents a home bias of consumers as it
lies above 0.5. For habit persistence, that is the rate at which habit stocks are carried
over from one period to the next, Ravn et al. (2008) use a value of 0.9876. For the
present model, a slightly more moderate value of 0.9 is assumed. The intensity of
habit formation is calibrated in between the two alternative values suggested by Ravn
et al. (2008), which are 0.52 and 0.57. The fiscal policy shock is the only stochastic
shock to the model. Government expenditure is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
with an autoregressive parameter of 0.55.
4 Results
The solution of the model is computed after taking a first-order linear approximation
around the deterministic steady state. The main results are presented in tables 2 and
3. Each table reports fiscal multipliers on aggregate output and fiscal multipliers on
private consumption in separate columns. These multipliers are computed for different
monetary policy regimes:
(1) A full monetary policy setting with threefold targeting as described above. That
is, inflation targeting, output gap targeting, and exchange rate targeting are
effective.
(2) A more classic monetary policy setting with inflation targeting and output gap
targeting only. Exchange rate targeting is disabled (γe = 0).
(3) A setting with flexible prices.
7The rule is based on Henderson McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993).
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Table 2 reports separately the multipliers attained under a home bias and the mul-
tipliers attained under a high degree of openness to trade.8 Note that all numbers
reported in table 2 represent cumulative multipliers over the entire transition phase
of T periods:
∑T
t=1(∆yt∆g
−1
t ) and
∑T
t=0(∆ct∆g
−1
t ). The main observations are the
following: Firstly, exchange rate flexibility clearly decreases the cumulative fiscal mul-
tiplier in the long run (compare cases (1) and (2) in table 2). By switching from the
full monetary policy setting to the one without exchange rate targeting, the fiscal mul-
tiplier on output decreases by 0.21 to 0.32 units of domestic currency. By how much
exactly depends on the degree of openness to trade. Likewise, the fiscal multiplier
on private consumption decreases by 0.15 to 0.39 units. Secondly, also openness to
trade substantially decreases the cumulative fiscal multiplier. A change from the home
biased case to the open case decreases the multiplier on output by 0.12 to 0.23 units,
and the multiplier on consumption by 0.12 to 0.36 units, depending on the monetary
policy regime that is in place.
Table 3 presents a distinction of fiscal multipliers for a low versus a high degree
of capital mobility.9 Note that instead of cumulative multipliers, table 3 reports fiscal
multipliers which are attained immediately in the first period of a shock: ∆y1∆g
−1
1 and
∆c1∆g
−1
1 . The results show that switching from high to low costs of holding foreign
capital increases the fiscal multiplier on output by 0.18. This holds for the case of
flexible prices, as will be discussed in the following section. Under the full monetary
policy regime, the effect of capital mobility with respect to the multiplier on output is
diminished.
5 Mechanism of a Government Expenditure Shock
In this section, the dynamics that drive the fiscal multipliers presented in the previous
section are to be discussed in detail. With regard to the research question, special
emphasis is laid on the role of openness. Note in advance that the model is linearly
approximated around the steady state, so no logs are taken. Whenever an impulse
response function (IRF) is displayed in absolute terms, in contrast to a relative IRF
or a multiplier, its values represent actual deviations from the steady state in levels.
With respect to the components of aggregate demand, this makes comparisons of the
IRFs more illustrative.
5.1 Response of Demand
Figure 1 presents the response of aggregate demand and its components to a fiscal
shock. The shock to government spending has a size of one unit of domestic cur-
rency. The responses are denoted in absolute levels. Output reacts more strongly
than government spending itself, hence there is a multiplier larger than one. Private
8A home bias is modeled by calibrating ω = 0.85, which is the same calibration as it is used by
Dellas et al. (2005). To model the case where households have a high preference for foreign goods,
the preference parameter is decreased to ω = 0.01.
9In the latter case, χ = 0.01, while in the case of low capital mobility χ = 1000. For table 3,
θ = 0.5 and γe = 1.5 are assumed, which represents a slight change compared to the benchmark
calibration.
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consumption responds less strongly to the fiscal shock, but also in a positive way.
Monetary policy follows an interest rate rule with inflation targeting and output gap
targeting. By consequence, the domestic interest rate increases in response to the
fiscal shock, as shown in figure 2. In figure 3, the cumulative multiplier effects of the
fiscal shock is shown. They are presented separately for aggregate output and private
consumption. The cumulative multiplier on output lies above one, converging to 1.09
in the limit, while the cumulative multiplier on private consumption is also positive
and converges to 0.15.
5.2 Components of the Fiscal Multiplier
The fiscal multiplier is driven by four main components: (1) A negative wealth effect,
which is typical for NK models, (2) a substitution effect that is due to counter-cyclical
firm markups (the real wage increases and households substitute consumption for
leisure), (3) a currency effect causing domestic and foreign demand to differ in their
elasticity to the domestic price, and (4) an interest rate effect which is related to
exchange rate targeting.
5.2.1 Wealth Effect
As it is typical for theoretical NK models, a positive government spending shock has a
negative wealth effect on the households. The government raises the tax it collects from
each household in order to finance its expenditure. It buys a share of total output of
domestic firms. These goods are not redistributed to the households or other agents in
the economy such that they could be used in any utility-delivering or productive way.
(An alternative way of modeling is that households get direct utility from government
expenditures, as it is done f.e. by Gali and Monacelli (2008).) Hence, households get
poorer and therefore increase their work effort. Aggregate output increases in response.
5.2.2 Substitution Effect (Counter-Cyclical Markups)
The mechanism of deep habit formation is explained in technical detail in sections
2.1.2 and 2.3. In short, at the level of the individual good, i, it implies that having
consumed i in the past increases the marginal utility of future consumption of i for a
given household.
The monopolistically competitive firms take advantage and set the wage rate and
the price of their goods such that their markups move in counter-cyclical fashion.
There are two reasons for this kind of behavior of the firms. Firstly, they take into
account the intra-temporal effect of an increase in aggregate demand, which raises
the price elasticity of the demand each individual firm i faces. Secondly, by lowering
today’s markup, the firms can acquire customers that will return in the future.
Figure 4 presents the responses of the firm markup, the real wage rate, and the
price of domestic goods. These responses are denoted in relative terms, representing
deviations from steady state in percentages. Evidently, movements in the markup
take place mainly through changes in the real wage, while the price of domestic goods
shows little movement. These results are entirely consistent with Ravn et al. (2008)
who show that in response to a shock in government spending the markup of domestic
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firms decreases, a result which is mainly based on an increasing domestic wage rate
(Ravn et al. 2008, figures 3 and 4). Cantore et al. (2012) find that in response to a
government spending shock, the real wage increases and does so virtually as a mirror
image of the decreasing firm markup (Cantore et al. 2012, figure 1). Note that it is
the formation of ‘deep’ habits which causes these kind of dynamics; If the intensity of
habit formation is turned down to zero, represented by the parameter θ, then the model
goes back to a more classic mechanism, where prices increase and wages decrease as a
result of a fiscal expansion. Note also that the real wage converges back to its steady
state rather rapidly; taking fewer periods to do so than the response of government
spending.
One can ask the question whether it is true that real-world markups fall in response
to a fiscal expansion. For example, Perotti (2008) provides evidence from several
countries based on a structural VAR (including the United States and the United
Kingdom) which is consistent with the real wage increasing in response to a fiscal
policy expansion. In the present model, similarly to the model of Ravn et al. (2008), the
markup equals the inverse of the domestic real product wage. Therefore, real product
wages which have been reported to increase in response to a positive government
spending shock by Perotti (2008) are consistent with counter-cyclical markups.
This substitution effect of counter-cyclical markups occurs in addition to the wealth
effect described above. It means that households increase their work effort even further
in response to a fiscal shock, substituting consumption for leisure. Simultaneously, the
substitution effect compensates the negative wealth effect with respect to consumption,
such that consumption increases in response to the fiscal shock (for most calibrations).
This mechanism boosts the output multiplier.
5.2.3 Currency Effect and Exchange Rate Flexibility
Exchange rate flexibility increases the fiscal multiplier in the short run, but decreases
it in the long run. Both the currency effect described in this paragraph and the
interest rate effect described in the following are related to the role of exchange rate
flexibility in this respect. The forward-looking households (with a discount factor of
β = 0.99) seek to smoothen out their consumption over time. Therefore, they spend
part of their additional budget on bonds. The higher demand for foreign assets causes
the domestic currency to depreciate in the short term. Figure 5 shows the resulting
increase in the real exchange rate, as well as the response of net foreign bonds held
by the domestic economy.10 Foreign consumers react to this currency depreciation by
demanding more domestic goods, which consequently yields a positive trade balance of
the domestic economy (see figure 6). Through this mechanism, the fiscal multiplier is
amplified. Hence, a more reactive/flexible exchange rate increases the fiscal multiplier
in the short term during the transition phase after the spending shock. Note that this
is a short term effect. It diminishes as the households sell out their foreign bonds over
time, and the real exchange rate and the trade balance converge back to steady state
rather rapidly.
10The IRFs are denoted in absolute terms. Note that in steady state foreign bond holdings are
zero, while the real exchange rate is equal to one.
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5.2.4 Interest Rate Effect and Exchange Rate Flexibility
Figure 7 presents the cumulative fiscal multiplier, both for the setting with exchange
rate targeting and for the setting without exchange rate targeting. Under an exchange
rate targeting rule, the domestic interest rate increases (further) in response to the
fiscal expansion. This gives the forward looking households an incentive to shift even
more consumption over time, meaning to consume less in the short term and more in
the long term. This mechanism is intensified by a more rigid exchange rate targeting
policy. Accordingly, if exchange rate targeting becomes more pronounced, the fiscal
multiplier gets higher in the long run, and lower in the short run.
5.3 Openness to Trade
Openness to trade decreases the fiscal multiplier. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate how
the fiscal multiplier on output and on consumption differs depending on whether the
households have a home bias or whether they are fully open to trade. The effect of
openness to trade on the fiscal multiplier is closely related to the mechanism of counter-
cyclical markups. The domestic households decide how to spend the additional budget
they have due to higher wages and a higher work effort. Their openness preference has
an important effect on their decision. With respect to the fiscal multiplier, it is vital
whether the households focus their additional demand on domestic goods, or whether
they pass it on to foreign suppliers.
5.4 Capital Mobility
Capital mobility increases the fiscal multiplier (in the short run). Figure 10 reports
the cumulative fiscal multiplier on output and on consumption in two separate graphs
in the top row. Each of these two graphs shows the multiplier for a low and a high
degree of capital mobility (represented by the parameter χ). The other plots show
impulse response functions in absolute levels. Prices are flexible in this setting. The
three graphs in the middle row refer to the substitution effect (of counter-cyclical
firm markups) which is described above, and the third row illustrates the currency
effect. High costs of holding foreign bonds (a high χ) make it expensive for domestic
households to invest in foreign bonds. As a result, the otherwise larger increase in the
net foreign asset position in response to a spending shock (as it is described above
in terms of the currency effect) is diminished. Consequently, the domestic currency
depreciates less strongly against the foreign currency. Finally, the increase in both the
foreign demand for domestic goods and the trade balance is diminished, and hence
the fiscal multiplier becomes smaller. In other words, restrictions on capital mobility
reduce the otherwise larger positive effect of foreign demand on the multiplier of a
domestic fiscal expansion. As shown by the three graphs in the second row of figure
10, firm markups and real wages do not respond significantly to changes in capital
mobility.
As discussed above, the currency effect is short-term. Therefore, the decrease in
the fiscal multiplier due to low capital mobility is also a short-term effect. Note that
capital mobility only significantly influences the fiscal multiplier if monetary policy
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does not follow exchange rate targeting. This is due to the latter having the analogous
effect of keeping the value of the domestic currency stable.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the implications of openness to trade, capital mobility, and ex-
change rate flexibility for the fiscal multiplier. I propose a dynamic New Open Econ-
omy Macroeconomics model which yields a mechanism of the effect of economic open-
ness as a determinant of the fiscal multiplier. A key element is given by counter-cyclical
firm markups. The resulting substitution effect for households creates a positive re-
sponse of consumption to a fiscal shock. Hereby, a negative effect of openness to trade
on the fiscal multiplier is created, which is a main feature of the model.
The main implications are: Openness to trade limits the fiscal multiplier, while
capital mobility increases the fiscal multiplier in the short run. In the limit, the effect
of capital mobility is close to zero. Further, in the short run of the transition phase
after a shock, flexible exchange rates can temporarily lead to a higher multiplier,
an effect which diminishes over time. In the (long-run) equilibrium, exchange rate
flexibility decreases the fiscal multiplier. In this sense, this dynamic analysis allows
for a more detailed interpretation than a static model, such as the IS-LM model. Also,
the model predicts a fundamentally different role of capital mobility compared to the
IS-LM model. The implications are consistent with empirical evidence.
Acknowledgements
I thank Harris Dellas and Fabrice Collard from the Department of Economics of the
University of Bern for their advice and support. I am also grateful to Simon Wieser
from the Winterthur Institute of Health Economics for the encouragement to pursue a
publication of this essay. Further, I thank my former colleagues Jürg Adamek, Guido
Baldi, Philipp Wegmüller, and Marc Zahner for fruitful discussions related to this
project.
17
A Appendix
A.1 FOC of the Households with Respect to Foreign Bonds
Equation (6), the first-order condition of the representative domestic household with
respect to foreign bonds, Bft , is derived according to:
0
!
=
∂L
∂Bft
= Ptet + χPte
2
tB
f
t − β
Λt+1
Λt
et+1R
?
tPt
1 + χetB
f
t = β
Λt+1
Λt
R?t
et+1
et
Λt︸︷︷︸
=λt/Pt
(1 + χ
etB
f
t︷︸︸︷
bft ) = β Λt+1︸︷︷︸
=λt+1/Pt+1
R?t
et+1
et
λt = β
R?t
1 + χbft
· et+1
et
· λt+1
πt+1
A.2 FOCs of the Domestic Firms
Similarly to the model by Ravn et al. (2008), the Lagrangian of firm i is given by
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
Φ0,t
{
[P dt (i)−Wt] · [xdc,t(i) + xdg,t(i) + xd?c,t(i)]−
ϕp
2
(
P dt (i)
P dt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Ptht
+Ptνc,t(i)
[(
P dt (i)
Pt
)−η
cdt + θs
d
c,t−1(i)− xdc,t(i)
]
+Ptνg,t(i)
[(
P dt (i)
Pt
)−η
gdt + θs
d
g,t−1(i)− xdg,t(i)
]
+Ptν
?
c,t(i)
[(
P dt (i)
etP ?t
)−η
cd?t + θs
d?
c,t−1(i)− xd?c,t(i)
]
+Pt%c,t(i)
[
sdc,t(i)− ρsdc,t−1(i)− (1− ρ)xdc,t(i)
]
+Pt%g,t(i)
[
sdg,t(i)− ρsdg,t−1(i)− (1− ρ)xdg,t(i)
]
+Pt%
?
c,t(i)
[
sd?c,t(i)− ρsd?c,t−1(i)− (1− ρ)xd?c,t(i)
]}
The FOCs are derived with respect to P dt (i), x
d
c,t(i), x
d
g,t(i), x
d?
c,t(i), s
d
c,t(i),s
d
g,t(i), and
sd?c,t(i).
∂L
∂P dt (i)
= yt(i)− ϕp
[
P dt (i)
P dt−1(i)
− 1
]
Pt
P dt−1(i)
ht
−ηPt
Pt
[
Pt
P dt (i)
]1+η [
νc,t(i)c
d
t + νg,t(i)g
d
t
]
− η Pt
etP ?t
[
etP
?
t
P dt (i)
]1+η
ν?c,t(i)c
d?
t
+Φt,t+1Et
{
ϕpPt+1
P dt+1(i)
[P dt (i)]
2
[
P dt+1(i)
P dt (i)
− 1
]
ht+1
}
!
= 0
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where Φt,t+1 = βΛt+1Λ
−1
t , with Λt being the Lagrange multiplier. The demand func-
tions of the domestic household and the government yield the following conditions:[
Pt
P dt (i)
]1+η
cdt =
Pt
P dt (i)
[xdc,t(i)− θsdc,t−1(i)][
Pt
P dt (i)
]1+η
gdt =
Pt
P dt (i)
[xdg,t(i)− θsdg,t−1(i)][
etP
?
t
P dt (i)
]1+η
cd?t =
etP
?
t
P dt (i)
[xd?c,t(i)− θsdc,t−1(i)]
Hence, the FOC with respect to P dt (i) can be re-written as:
yt(i)− ϕp
[
P dt (i)
P dt−1(i)
− 1
]
Pt
P dt−1(i)
ht
−η Pt
P dt (i)
{
νc,t(i)[x
d
c,t(i)− θsdc,t−1(i)]
+νg,t(i)[x
d
g,t(i)− θsdg,t−1(i)] + ν?c,t(i)[xd?c,t(i)− θsd?c,t−1(i)]
}
+βϕp
Λt+1
Λt
Et
{
Pt+1
P dt+1(i)
[P dt (i)]
2
[
P dt+1(i)
P dt (i)
− 1
]
ht+1
}
!
= 0
Further FOCs are given by
∂L
∂xdc,t(i)
= P dt (i)−Wt − Ptνc,t(i)− (1− ρ)Pt%c,t(i)
!
= 0
∂L
∂xdg,t(i)
= P dt (i)−Wt − Ptνg,t(i)− (1− ρ)Pt%g,t(i)
!
= 0
∂L
∂xd?c,t(i)
= P dt (i)−Wt − Ptν?c,t(i)− (1− ρ)Pt%?c,t(i)
!
= 0
∂L
∂sdc,t(i)
= Pt%c,t(i) + β
Λt+1
Λt
[Pt+1νc,t+1(i)θ − Pt+1%t+1(i)ρ]
!
= 0
∂L
∂sdg,t(i)
= Pt%g,t(i) + β
Λt+1
Λt
[Pt+1νg,t+1(i)θ − Pt+1%t+1(i)ρ]
!
= 0
∂L
∂sd?c,t(i)
= Pt%
?
c,t(i) + β
Λt+1
Λt
[
Pt+1ν
?
c,t+1(i)θ − Pt+1%?t+1(i)ρ
] !
= 0
Assuming that for a given type of good (domestic vs. foreign), a given type of consumer
(private vs. public), and a given location of a consumer (domestic vs. foreign), initial
habit stocks are identical across varieties i. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium, it must
hold that P dt (i) = P
d
t and therefore x
d
c,t(i) = x
d
c,t, x
d
g,t(i) = x
d
g,t, x
d?
c,t(i) = x
d?
c,t, s
d
c,t(i) =
sdc,t, s
d
g,t(i) = s
d
g,t, and s
d?
c,t(i) = s
d?
c,t. That is, all the is drop. Therefore, the first-order
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conditions of the general equilibrium are equal to
0 = pdt yt − ϕp
(
πdt − 1
)
πdt ht − η
[
νc,t(x
d
c,t − θsdc,t−1)
+νg,t(x
d
g,t − θsdg,t−1) + ν?c,t(xd?c,t − θsd?c,t−1)
]
+ βϕp
λt+1
λt
πdt+1
(
πdt+1 − 1
)
ht+1
pdt − wt
P dt
P dt
= νc,t + (1− ρ)%c,t
pdt − wt
P dt
P dt
= νg,t + (1− ρ)%g,t
pdt − wt
P dt
P dt
= ν?c,t + (1− ρ)%?c,t
%c,t = β
λt+1
λt
(ρ%c,t+1 − θνc,t+1)
%g,t = β
λt+1
λt
(ρ%g,t+1 − θνg,t+1)
%?c,t = β
λt+1
λt
(
ρ%?c,t+1 − θν?c,t+1
)
where πdt = P
d
t (i)[P
d
t−1(i)]
−1, λt+1λ
−1
t = Λt+1Pt+1Λ
−1
t P
−1
t , and Wt = wtPt. I define
pdt = P
d
t P
−1
t and p
f
t = P
f
t (P
?
t )
−1, where P ?t is the foreign CPI which is exogenous to
the domestic small open economy. In combination with the definition of the domestic
real exchange rate, rert = etP
?
t P
−1
t , this yields rert p
f
t = etP
f
t P
−1
t . The last equality
allows for simplification of the above mentioned budget constraints of the producer’s
problem. In a symmetric equilibrium, where there is no difference between any of the
agents i, it must hold that:
xdc,t = (p
d
t )
−ηcdt + θs
d
c,t−1 (28)
xfc,t = (rertp
f
t )
−ηcft + θs
f
c,t−1 (29)
xdg,t = (p
d
t )
−ηgdt + θs
d
g,t−1 (30)
xd?c,t =
(
pdt
rert
)−η
cd?t + θs
d?
c,t−1 (31)
sdc,t = ρs
d
c,t−1 + (1− ρ)xdc,t (32)
sfc,t = ρs
f
c,t−1 + (1− ρ)x
f
c,t (33)
sdg,t = ρs
d
g,t−1 + (1− ρ)xdg,t (34)
sd?c,t = ρs
d?
c,t−1 + (1− ρ)xd?c,t (35)
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A.3 List of Conditions of the General Equilibrium
cobjt =
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1 = γ pdt + (1− γ) rert p
f
t
ct = x
d
c,t + x
f
c,t
gt = x
d
g,t
yt = x
d
c,t + x
d
g,t + x
d?
c,t
ht = yt +
χ
2
(bft )
2 +
ϕp
2
(πd − 1)2ht
bft =
et
et−1πt
R?t−1b
f
t−1 − ht + yt + xd?c,t − x
f
c,t
pdt =
πdt
πt
pdt−1
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rert =
pft
pft−1
· rert−1
πt
(cd?t )
−σ = βR?t (c
d?
t+1)
−σ p
f
t
pft+1
log(Rt) = ρr log(Rt−1) +
(1− ρr)
{
log(R̄) + γπ[log(πt)− log(π̄)]
+γy[log(yt)− log(ȳ)] + γe[log(et)− log(ē)]}
µt = p
d
t − wt
TBt = x
d?
c,t − x
f
c,t
where πdt = P
d
t (P
d
t−1)
−1, Wt = wtPt, p
d
t = P
d
t P
−1
t , p
f
t = P
f
t (P
?
t )
−1, pd?t = P
d?
t P
−1
t , rert
= etP
?
t P
−1
t , rertp
f
t = etP
f
t P
−1
t , and b
f
t = etB
f
t . Note that θ
c = θg = θ? = θ implies
that in equilibrium νc = νg = ν and %c = %g = %. The exogenous processes are given
by
gt+1 = γ
ggt + (1− γg)ḡ + εgt+1
cd?t+1 = γ
d?cd?t + (1− γd?)c̄d? + εd?t+1
pft+1 = γ
fpft + (1− γf )p̄f + ε
f
t+1
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Tables
Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Openness preference ω 0.850
Habit persistence ρ 0.900
Habit formation θ 0.540
Substitutability between varieties i η 5.000
International substitutability (d vs. f) ξ 1.500
Discount factor β 0.990
Utility σ 1.010
Frisch elasticity (1 + φ) 1.010
Preference ψ 2.144
Price adjustment ϕp 1.000
Capital adjustment χ 10.000
Persistence (policy rule) ρR 0.010
Inflation coefficient (policy rule) γπ 0.500
Output gap coefficient (policy rule) γy 0.050
Exchange rate coefficient (policy rule) γe 1.000
Table 2: Cumulative Fiscal Multiplier in the Limit
Aggregate Output Private Consumption
(1) Full Monetary Policy (Benchmark)
Home Bias (ω = 0.85) 1.30 0.30
Open for Trade (ω = 0.01) 1.18 0.18
(2) Flexible Exchange Rate
Home Bias (ω = 0.85) 1.09 0.15
Open for Trade (ω = 0.01) 0.86 -0.21
24
Table 3: Immediate Fiscal Multiplier (First Period)
Aggregate Output Private Consumption
(1) Full Monetary Policy (Benchmark∗)
Immobile Capital (χ = 1000) 1.30 0.30
Mobile Capital (χ = 0.01) 1.29 0.22
(3) Flexible Prices
Immobile Capital (χ = 1000) 1.34 0.34
Mobile Capital (χ = 0.01) 1.52 0.35
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses (in Levels) to a Government Spending Shock
Figure 2: Relative Impulse Responses (in Percentage Points of the Steady State)
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Figure 3: Cumulative Multipliers of a Government Spending Shock
Figure 4: Relative Impulse Responses (in Percentages of the Steady State)
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses (in Levels) to a Government Spending Shock
Figure 6: Impulse Responses (in Levels) to a Government Spending Shock
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Figure 7: Cumulative Output Multipliers of a Government Spending Shock for Differ-
ent Monetary Policy Regimes
Figure 8: Cumulative Output Multipliers of a Government Spending Shock for Differ-
ent Degrees of Openness to Trade
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Figure 9: Cumulative Consumption Multipliers of a Government Spending Shock for
Different Degrees of Openness to Trade
30
Figure 10: Responses to a Government Spending Shock for Different Degrees of Capital
Mobility
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